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Abstract—We consider multi-agent, convex optimization pro-
grams subject to separable constraints, where the constraint
function of each agent involves only its local decision vector,
while the decision vectors of all agents are coupled via a common
objective function. We focus on a regularized variant of the
so called Jacobi algorithm for decentralized computation in
such problems. We first consider the case where the objective
function is quadratic, and provide a fixed-point theoretic analysis
showing that the algorithm converges to a minimizer of the
centralized problem. Moreover, we quantify the potential benefits
of such an iterative scheme by comparing it against a scaled
projected gradient algorithm. We then consider the general case
and show that all limit points of the proposed iteration are
optimal solutions of the centralized problem. The efficacy of the
proposed algorithm is illustrated by applying it to the problem
of optimal charging of electric vehicles, where, as opposed to
earlier approaches, we show convergence to an optimal charging
scheme for a finite, possibly large, number of vehicles.
Index Terms—Decentralized optimization, Jacobi algorithm,
iterative methods, optimal charging control, electric vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
OPTIMIZATION in multi-agent systems has attracted sig-nificant attention in the control and operations research
communities, due to its applicability to different domains, e.g.,
energy systems [1], [2], mobility systems [3], [4], [5], robotic
networks [6], etc. In this paper we focus on a specific class
of multi-agent optimization programs that are convex and are
subject to constraints that are separable, i.e., the constraint
function of each agent involves only its local decision vector.
The agents’ decision vectors are, however, coupled by means
of a common objective function. The considered structure, al-
though specific, captures a wide class of engineering problems,
like the electric vehicle optimal charging problem studied in
this paper. Solving such problems in a centralized fashion
would require agents to share their local constraint functions
with each other, while even if this was possible it would
unnecessarily increase the computational burden.
To allow for a computationally tractable solution, while ac-
counting for information sharing issues, we adopt an iterative,
decentralized perspective, where agents perform local compu-
tations in parallel, and then exchange with each other their
new solutions, or broadcast them to some central authority
that sends an update to each agent. Admittedly, distributed
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optimization offers a more general communication setup,
however, the fact that agents decision vectors are coupled via
the objective function poses additional difficulties, preventing
the use of standard distributed algorithms [7], [8]. Even
upon an epigraphic reformulation, the resulting problem will
not exhibit the structure typically encountered in distributed
optimization since the resulting coupling constraint will not
necessarily be of “budget” form as required, e.g., in [9].
A. Related work
From a cooperative optimization point of view, algorithms
for decentralized solutions to convex optimization problems
with separable constraints can be found in [10], [11], and
references therein. Two main algorithmic directions can be
distinguished, both of them relying on an iterative process. The
first one is based on each agent performing at every iteration
a local gradient descent step, while keeping the decision
variables of all other agents fixed to the values communicated
at the previous iteration [12]–[14]. Under certain structural
assumptions (differentiability of the objective function and
Lipschitz continuity of its gradient), it is shown that this
scheme converges to some minimizer of the centralized prob-
lem, for an appropriately chosen gradient step-size.
The second direction for decentralized optimization involves
mainly the so called Jacobi algorithm, which serves as an
alternative to gradient algorithms. The Gauss-Seidel algorithm
exhibits similarities with the Jacobi one, but is not of par-
allelizable nature [15], unless a coloring scheme is adopted
(see Section 1.2.4 in [10]). Under the Jacobi algorithmic
setup, at every iteration, instead of performing a gradient
step, each agent minimizes the common objective function
subject to its local constraints, while keeping the decision
vectors of all other agents fixed to their values at the previous
iteration. A regularized version of the Jacobi algorithm has
been proposed in [16], [17], and more recently in [18], [19].
Other parallelizable iterative methods are proposed in [4], [20],
[21], where, however, partially separable cost functions are
considered.
From a non-cooperative perspective there has recently been
a notable research activity using tools from mean-field and
aggregative game theory. Under a deterministic, discrete-time
setting like the one considered in the present paper, [3], [5],
[22] deal with the non-cooperative counterpart of our work,
for the case of quadratic objective functions. In all cases, the
considered algorithm is shown to converge not to a minimizer,
but to an approximate Nash equilibrium of a related game, and
to an exact Nash equilibrium in the limiting case where the
number of agents tends to infinity. The recent work of [23]
shows convergence to an exact Nash equilibrium for a finite
number of agents.
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2B. Contributions of this work and organization of the paper
In this paper we adopt a cooperative point of view, and
consider a regularized Jacobi algorithm similar to the one in
[16], [17]. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We establish an equivalence between the set of minimiz-
ers of the problem under study and the set of fixed-points
of the mapping induced by the considered regularized
Jacobi algorithm.
2) For the case where the objective function is quadratic we
follow a fixed-point theoretic analysis and show conver-
gence to an optimal solution of the centralized problem
counterpart. As opposed to [16], [17], we provide an
explicit calculation of the regularization coefficient that
ensures convergence, and show that the convergence
properties of this approach outperform the ones of scaled
projected gradient algorithms. As such, our algorithm not
only serves as the cooperative counterpart of [23], but also
enjoys superior convergence properties.
3) In the case of general differentiable objective functions,
we provide a proof that all limit points of the proposed
iteration are optimal solutions of the centralized problem
counterpart; such a proof is not provided in [16], [17].
4) We extend the results of [3], [5], [22] on electric vehicle
charging control, achieving convergence to an optimal
charging scheme with a finite number of vehicles. This
serves also as an extension of [4], where convergence
to the optimal objective value and not to the optimal
charging solution was provided.
The results obtained here extend significantly our earlier work
in [24], where only the case of quadratic functions was
considered, omitting various proofs due to space limitations,
and no formal comparison with the gradient methods was
provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the problem under study and states the proposed
algorithm. In Section III we provide the main convergence
result for the case where the objective function is quadratic,
and a comparison with scaled projected gradient methods.
Section IV provides a convergence analysis for the general
case of differentiable objective function, while the proof is
deferred to the Appendix. Section V provides application of
the developed scheme to the problem of optimal charging of
electric vehicles and includes an extensive simulation study,
while Section VI concludes the paper and outlines some
directions for future research.
II. DECENTRALIZED PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Problem statement
We consider the following multi-agent constrained opti-
mization problem
P : min
{xi∈Rni}mi=1
f(x1, . . . , xm) (1)
subject to
xi ∈ Xi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, (2)
where each agent i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, has a local decision vector
xi ∈ Rni and a local constraint set Xi ⊆ Rni , and cooperates
Algorithm 1 Decentralized algorithm
1: Initialization
2: k = 0.
3: Consider xi0 ∈ Xi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
4: For i = 1, . . . ,m repeat until convergence
5: Agent i receives x−ik from central authority.
6: xik+1 = arg minzi∈Xi
{
f(zi, x−ik ) + c‖zi − xik‖2
}
.
7: k ← k + 1.
to determine a minimizer of f : Rn1× . . .×Rnm → R, which
couples its decision vector with those of the other agents.
We study, in particular, the case when the following assump-
tion holds.
Assumption 1. The objective function f : Rn1× . . .×Rnm →
R is given by
f(x1, . . . , xm) = x>Qx+ q>x,
where x = [x1,>, . . . , xm,>]> ∈ Rn with n = ∑mi=1 ni, Q ∈
Rn×n is symmetric and positive definite (Q = Q>  0) and
q ∈ Rn. Moreover, the sets Xi ⊆ Rni , i = 1, . . . ,m, are
non-empty, compact and convex.
Note that Q is assumed to be symmetric without loss of
generality; in the opposite case it could be split in a symmetric
and an antisymmetric part, with the latter giving rise to terms
that simplify each other.
Remark 1 (Problem generalization). The considered
framework allows for objective functions of the form
f(x1, . . . , xm) = x>Qx + q>x +
∑m
i=0 g
i(xi), where
the gi(xi) are convex functions that depend on the local
decision vectors xi only, i = 1, . . . ,m, and may be useful
to encode a utility function for each agent. In this case
an epigraphic reformulation can be exploited to bring
the cost back to be quadratic, while preserving constraint
separability. More precisely, by introducing an additional
local variable, say hi, in the decision vector yi = [xi,> hi]>
of agent i, the local constraint set can be defined as
Y i = Xi ∩ {gi(xi) ≤ hi}, while the objective function can
be rewritten as x>Qx + q>x +
∑m
i=0 h
i, which is quadratic
in y = [y1,> . . . ym,>]>.
Under Assumption 1, given that function f is continuously
differentiable and convex and the constraint set X = X1 ×
· · · × Xm is non-empty and compact, by the Weierstrass’
theorem ( [10, Proposition A8, p. 625]), P admits at least
one optimal solution. However, P does not necessarily admit
a unique minimizer.
With a slight abuse of notation, for each i, i = 1, . . . ,m,
let f(·, x−i) : Rni → R be the objective function in (1) as a
function of the decision vector xi of agent i, when the decision
vectors of all other agents are fixed to x−i ∈ Rn−ni . We will
occasionally also write f(x) instead of f(x1, . . . , xm). We
will use these notations interchangeably, but the interpretation
will always be clear from the context.
B. Regularized Jacobi algorithm
3Solving problem P in a centralized fashion is not always
possible since agents may not be willing to share Xi, i =
1, . . . ,m. Moreover, even if this was the case, solving P in
one shot might be computationally challenging. To overcome
this and account for information sharing issues, motivated by
the particular structure of P with separable constraint sets,
we follow a decentralized, iterative approach as described in
Algorithm 1.
Initially, each agent i, i = 1, . . . ,m, starts with some value
xi0 ∈ Xi, such that
(
x10, . . . , x
m
0
)
is feasible and constitutes
an estimate of what the minimizer of P might be (step 3,
Algorithm 1). At iteration k + 1, each agent i receives the
values of all other agents x−ik (step 5, Algorithm 1) from the
central authority, and updates the estimate of its own decision
vector xi by solving a local minimization problem (step 6,
Algorithm 1). The performance criterion in this local problem
is a linear combination of the objective f(zi, x−ik ), where the
variables of all other agents apart from the i-th one are fixed
to their values at iteration k, and a quadratic regularization
term, penalizing the difference between the decision vector zi
and the value of agent’s i own variable at iteration k, i.e.,
xik. The relative importance of these two terms is dictated
by the regularization coefficient c ∈ R+, which plays a key
role in determining the convergence properties of Algorithm 1.
Note that under Assumption 1, and due to the presence of the
quadratic penalty term, the resulting problem is strictly convex
with respect to zi, and hence admits a unique minimizer.
Remark 2 (Information exchange). To implement Algorithm
1, at iteration k+1, it is needed that some central authority, or
common processing node, collects and broadcasts the current
solution of each agent to all others, and that the agents have
knowledge of the common objective function f so that each of
them can compute f(·, x−ik ) (alternatively the central authority
can broadcast it to each agent i, i = 1, . . . ,m). However,
in the case where objective functions that are coupled only
through the average of some variables, the central authority
needs to broadcast only the average value. Each agent will
then be able to compute f(·, x−ik ) by subtracting from the
average the value of its local decision vector at iteration k,
i.e., xik. The reader is referred to the case study of Section V
for an application that exhibits this structure.
III. MAIN CONVERGENCE RESULT
In this section we analyze Algorithm 1 and show that, for
an appropriate choice of the regularization coefficient c, the
algorithm converges to a minimizer of P .
We start defining some matrices that will be used in the
following: for all i = 1, . . . ,m, let Qi,i denote the i-th block
of Q, with row and column indices corresponding to xi, where
x = [x1,> . . . xm,>]>. Denote then by Qd a block diagonal
matrix whose i-th block is Qi,i, and let Qz = Q−Qd denote
the off (block) diagonal part of Q. Since Q is assumed to be
symmetric, Qz is symmetric as well and its eigenvalues are all
real. Since Qz has zero trace, at least one of its eigenvalues
will be non-negative. As a result, λmaxQz ≥ 0, where λmaxQz
denotes the maximum eigenvalue of Qz .
We are now in a position to state one of the main results
of this paper.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, if c > λmaxQz , then Algorithm
1 converges to a minimizer of P .
Theorem 1 provides an explicit bound on c that ensures
convergence. Such a bound is derived by a fixed-point theo-
retical approach. The preliminary results in Section III-A are
instrumental to the proof of Theorem 1 in Section III-B, and
hold for a more general class of objective functions than the
quadratic ones in Assumption 1. Finally, in Section III-C we
show that Algorithm 1 can be reinterpreted as a step of a
scaled projected gradient algorithm, derive a bound on c for
convergence to some minimizer based on this reinterpretation,
and show that the bound provided in Theorem 1 is tighter.
A. Preliminary results
In this section we define appropriate mappings and establish
connections between the set of minimizers of the optimization
problem with separable constraint P and the set of fixed-points
of those mappings. Results hold for the class of objective func-
tions specified in Assumption 2, which includes the quadratic
objective functions in Assumption 1.
Assumption 2. The function f : Rn1 × . . . × Rnm → R is
continuously differentiable, and jointly convex with respect to
all arguments. Moreover, the sets Xi ⊆ Rni , i = 1, . . . ,m,
are non-empty, compact and convex.
1) Minimizers and fixed-points definitions: By (1)-(2), the
set of minimizers of P is given by
M = arg min
{zi∈Xi}mi=1
f(z1, . . . , zm) ⊆ X. (3)
Following the discussion below Assumption 1, M is non-
empty. Note that M is not necessarily a singleton; this will
be the case if f is jointly strictly convex with respect to its
arguments.
For each i, i = 1, . . . ,m, consider the mappings T i :
X → Xi and T˜ i : X → Xi, defined such that, for any
x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X ,
T i(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
‖zi − xi‖2 (4)
subject to
f(zi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i)
T˜ i(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
{
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2} . (5)
The mapping in (4) serves as a tie-break rule to select, in
case f(·, x−i) admits multiple minimizers over Xi, the one
closer to xi with respect to the Euclidean norm. Note that,
with a slight abuse of notation, in (4) and (5) we use equality
instead of inclusion since the corresponding minimizers T i(x)
and T˜ i(x), respectively, are unique. Note also that with xk in
place of x, (5) implies that the update step 6 in Algorithm 1
can be equivalently represented by xik+1 = T˜
i(xk).
Define also the mappings T : X → X and T˜ : X →
X , such that their components are given by T i and T˜ i,
4respectively, for i = 1, . . . ,m, i.e., T =
(
T 1, . . . , Tm
)
and T˜ =
(
T˜ 1, . . . , T˜m
)
. The mappings T and T˜ can be
equivalently written as
T (x) = arg min
z∈X
m∑
i=1
‖zi − xi‖2 (6)
subject to
f(zi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
T˜ (x) = arg min
z∈X
m∑
i=1
{
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2} , (7)
where the terms inside the summation in (6) and (7) are
decoupled. The set of fixed-points of T and T˜ is, respectively,
given by
FT =
{
x ∈ X : x = T (x)}, (8)
FT˜ =
{
x ∈ X : x = T˜ (x)}, (9)
and can be equivalently characterized in terms of the individual
components of T and T˜ , as
FT =
{
x ∈ X : xi = T i(x), for all i = 1, . . . ,m}, (10)
FT˜ =
{
x ∈ X : xi = T˜ i(x), for all i = 1, . . . ,m}, (11)
to facilitate the subsequent derivations.
2) Connections between minimizers and fixed-points: We
report here a fundamental optimality result, that we will often
use in the sequel.
Proposition 1 ( [10, Proposition 3.1]). Under Assumption 2,
1) if x ∈ X minimizes f over X , then (z−x)>∇f(x) ≥ 0,
for all z ∈ X .
2) if f is also convex on X , then the condition of the
previous part is also sufficient for x to minimize f over
X , i.e., x ∈ arg minz∈X f(z).
We start by showing that the set of minimizers M of P in
(3) and the set of fixed-points FT of the mapping T in (6)
coincide. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, M = FT .
Proof. 1) M ⊆ FT : Fix any x ∈ M . For each i = 1, . . . ,m,
denote x by (xi, x−i). The fact that x ∈ M implies that
(xi, x−i) is a minimizer of f , for all i = 1, . . . ,m. As a result,
f(xi, x−i) will be no greater than the values that f may take
over X , and hence also for any values it may take if evaluated
at (ζi, x−i), for any ζi ∈ Xi, i.e., f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i),
for all ζi ∈ Xi. The last statement can be equivalently written
as
f(xi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i), (12)
which means that x satisfies the inequality in (6). Moreover x
is also optimal for the objective function in (6), since it results
in zero cost. Hence, by (6), x is a fixed-point of T , which, by
(10), implies that x ∈ FT , thus concluding the first part of the
proof.
2) FT ⊆ M : Fix any x ∈ FT . By the definition of
FT , and due to the inequality in (6) that is embedded in
the definition of T , we have that for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
f(xi, x−i) ≤ minζi∈Xi f(ζi, x−i). The last statement implies
that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, xi is the minimizer of f(·, x−i)
over Xi. For all i = 1, . . . ,m, by the first part of Proposition
1 (with f(·, x−i) in place of f ) we then have that
(zi − xi)>∇if(xi, x−i) ≥ 0, for all zi ∈ Xi, (13)
where ∇if(xi, x−i) is the i-th component of the gradient
∇f(·, x−i) of f(·, x−i), evaluated at xi. By (13), we then
have that
∑m
i=1(z
i − xi)>∇if(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 for all zi ∈ Xi,
i = 1, . . . ,m, which, by setting x = (x1, . . . , xm), z =
(z1, . . . , zm), can be written as (z − x)>∇f(x) ≥ 0, for all
z ∈ X . By the second part of Proposition 1, and since f
is jointly convex with respect to all elements of x, the last
statement implies that x is a minimizer of f over X , i.e.,
x ∈M , thus concluding the second part of the proof.
Note that the connection between minimizers, fixed-points
and variational inequalities, similar to the ones that appear
in the proof of Proposition 2 (e.g., see (13)), has been also
investigated in [25], in the context of Nash equilibria in non-
cooperative games.
We next show that the set of fixed-points FT of T and the
set of fixed-points FT˜ of T˜ coincide. This is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, FT = FT˜ .
Proof. 1) FT ⊆ FT˜ : Fix any x ∈ FT . By (10), this is equiva-
lent to the fact that xi = T i(x), for all i = 1, . . . ,m, which,
due to the definition of T implies that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
f(xi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i). (14)
This implies that xi minimizes f(·, x−i) over Xi, hence, by
the first part of Proposition 1 (with f(·, x−i) in place of f )
we have that
(zi − xi)>∇if(xi, x−i) ≥ 0, for all zi ∈ Xi, (15)
where ∇if(xi, x−i) is the i-th component of the gradient
∇f(·, x−i) of f(·, x−i), evaluated at xi.
Let fc(zi, x) = f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2, for all zi, i =
1, . . . ,m, and notice that ∇fc(xi, x) = ∇f(xi, x−i), where
∇fc(xi, x) is the gradient of fc(·, x), evaluated at xi. The
latter is due to the fact that the gradient of the quadratic penalty
term vanishes at xi. By (15), we then have that, for all i =
1, . . . ,m,
(zi − xi)>∇ifc(xi, x) ≥ 0, for all zi ∈ Xi. (16)
Since fc(·, x) is strictly convex with respect to its first argu-
ment, by the second part of Proposition 1 (with fc(·, x) in
place of f ), (16) implies that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, xi is the
unique minimizer of fc(·, x) over Xi, i.e.,
xi = arg min
zi∈Xi
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2. (17)
By (5), (17) is equivalent to xi = T˜ i(x), for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
thus concluding the first part of the proof.
2) FT˜ ⊆ FT : Fix any x ∈ FT˜ . By (11) this is equivalent to
5the fact that xi = T˜ i(u), for all i = 1, . . . ,m, which, by the
definition of T˜ i in (5), implies that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
xi = arg min
zi∈Xi
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2. (18)
Let again fc(zi, x) = f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi−xi‖2. Equation (18)
implies then that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, xi minimizes fc(·, x)
over Xi, and by the first part of Proposition 1 (with fc(·, x)
in place of f ) leads to
(zi − xi)>∇ifc(xi, x) ≥ 0, for all zi ∈ Xi, (19)
where ∇ifc(xi, x) is the i-th component of the gradient
∇fc(·, x) of fc(·, x), evaluated at xi.
Notice that ∇fc(xi, x) = ∇f(xi, x−i), where ∇f(xi, x−i)
is the gradient of f(·, x−i), evaluated at xi, since the gradient
of ‖zi−xi‖2 with respect to zi vanishes at xi. Therefore, for
all i = 1, . . . ,m, (19) leads to
(zi − xi)>∇if(xi, x−i) ≥ 0, for all zi ∈ Xi, (20)
Since f(·, x−i) is convex with respect to its first argu-
ment, by the second part of Proposition 1, (20) implies
that xi minimizes f(·, x−i) over Xi. In other words, xi ∈
arg minzi∈Xi f(zi, x−i), for all i = 1, . . . ,m. This in turn
implies that, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(zi, x−i), for all zi ∈ Xi,
⇔ f(xi, x−i) ≤ min
zi∈Xi
f(zi, x−i). (21)
The last inequality shows that u satisfies the inequality in (6)
in the definition of T . Moreover, it minimizes the objective
function in (6), since it results in zero cost. Therefore, we have
x = T (x), thus concluding the second part of the proof.
A direct consequence of Propositions 2 and 3 is that the set
of minimizers M of P coincides with the set of fixed-points of
the mapping T˜ . This is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 2, M = FT˜ .
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Step 6 of Algorithm 1 can be equivalently written as xik+1 =
T˜ i(xk), which entails that xk+1 = T˜ (xk), i.e., one iteration
of Algorithm 1 for the multi-agent system corresponds to a
Picard-Banach iteration of the mapping T˜ (see [26] (Chapter
1.2) for a definition).
Since the set of fixed-points of T˜ is non-empty (it coincides
with M due to Corollary 1), we just need to prove that T˜
is firmly non-expansive (see [27] (Section 1) for a definition
in general Hilbert spaces). If that is the case, then, by the
results of [27], [28], we have that the Picard-Banach iteration
converges to a fixed-point of T˜ , for any initial condition xi0 ∈
Xi, i = 1, . . . ,m. By Corollary 1 this fixed-point will also be
a minimizer of P .
We next show that if c > λmaxQz , then, the mapping T˜ (·) is
indeed firmly non-expansive with respect to ‖·‖Qd+Ic−Q, i.e.,
‖T˜ (x)− T˜ (y)‖2Qd+Ic−Q
≤ (x− y)>(Qd + Ic −Q)(T˜ (x)− T˜ (y)), (22)
thus concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
Under Assumption 1, the mapping T˜ in (7) is given by
T˜ (x) = arg min
z∈X
m∑
i=1
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2
= arg min
z∈X
m∑
i=1
(zi)>(Qi,i + Ic)zi
+ (2(x−i)>Q−i,i − 2(xi)>Ic + q>i )zi
= arg min
z∈X
z>(Qd + Ic)z + (2x>Qz − 2x>Ic + q>)z.
(23)
Notice the slight abuse of notation in (23), where the weighted
identity matrix Ic in the second and the third equality are not of
the same dimension. Let ξ(x) = (Qd+Ic)−1(Icx−Qzx−q/2)
denote the unconstrained minimizer of (23). We then have that
T˜ (x) = arg min
z∈X
(z − ξ(x))>(Qd + Ic)(z − ξ(x))
= [ξ(x)]
X
Qd+Ic
, (24)
where [ξ(x)]XQd+Ic denotes the projection, with respect to || ·||Qd+Ic , of ξ(x) on X . Note that Qd + Ic is always positive
definite for c ∈ R+, so that its inverse exists, and the projection
is well defined.
We have that
‖T˜ (x)− T˜ (y)‖2Qd+Ic
= ‖ [ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
‖2Qd+Ic
≤ (ξ(x)− ξ(y))>(Qd + Ic)([ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
)
= (x− y)>(I −Q(Qd + Ic)−1)(Qd + Ic)
× ([ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
)
= (x− y)>(Qd + Ic −Q)([ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
),
(25)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of a
firmly non-expansive mapping and the fact that any projection
mapping is firmly non-expansive (see Proposition 4.8 in [29]).
The second equality is due to the definition ξ, and the last one
follows after performing the matrix multiplication.
Since Q  0, then ‖T˜ (x) − T˜ (y)‖2Qd+Ic−Q ≤ ‖T˜ (x) −
T˜ (y)‖2Qd+Ic . This, together with (25), implies that
‖ [ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
‖2Qd+Ic−Q
≤ (x− y)>(Qd + Ic −Q)([ξ(x)]XQd+Ic − [ξ(y)]
X
Qd+Ic
).
(26)
By the definition of a firmly non-expansive mapping [29], (26)
implies that, if Qd + Ic − Q  0, T˜ is firmly non-expansive
with respect to || · ||Qd+Ic−Q. The condition Qd + Ic−Q  0
can be satisfied by choosing c > λmaxQz .
C. Connection with gradient algorithms
Recalling the formulation in (23) and (24), xik+1 = T˜
i(xk),
i = 1, . . . ,m, in step 6 of Algorithm 1 can be equivalently
6written as a scaled projected gradient step as follows:
xk+1 = [ξ(xk)]
X
Qd+Ic
=
[
(Qd + Ic)
−1(Qd + Ic −Q)xk − (Qd + Ic)−1 q
2
]X
Qd+Ic
=
[
xk − (Qd + Ic)−1(Qxk + q
2
)
]X
Qd+Ic
=
[
xk − 1
2c
(
Qd
c
+ I)−1(2Qxk + q)
]X
Qd
c +I
(27)
where, the first equality follows recalling the definition of ξ(x)
and of Qz , and the last equality is obtained scaling by c.
As one can see the gradient 2Qx + q of the original cost
appears from the definition of ξ(x), 1/(2c) plays the role of
the gradient step-size, and (
Qd
c
+ I) is the scaling matrix (see
[10, Section 3.3.3]).
Notice that Qd is symmetric with Qd  0, as a result of
Q having the same property. Therefore, for any c > 0, the
scaling matrix (
Qd
c
+ I) satisfies the positivity condition
(x− y)>(Qd
c
+ I)(x− y) ≥ ‖x− y‖22, for all x, y ∈ X.
(28)
Under (28), by Proposition 3.7, p. 217 of [10] we have that
the scaled projected gradient iteration (27) converges to some
minimizer of P for a sufficiently small step-size 1/(2c). This
step-size is, however, not quantified in [10]; we perform this
in the sequel since it provides the means to compare our
methodology with a scaled projected gradient algorithm.
We can write xk+1 in (27) as the unique solution to the
following quadratic minimization program:
xk+1 = arg min
z∈X
c(z − xk)>(Qd
c
+ I)(z − xk)
+ c(z − xk)>(2Qxk + q). (29)
By optimality of xk+1, and since z = xk ∈ X results in zero
objective value, we have that
c(xk+1 − xk)>(Qd
c
+ I)(xk+1 − xk)
+ (xk+1 − xk)>(2Qxk + q) ≤ 0,
⇔ (xk+1 − xk)>(2Qxk + q)
≤ −c(xk+1 − xk)>(Qd
c
+ I)(xk+1 − xk). (30)
By (28) and (30) (notice that xk+1, xk ∈ X), we thus have
that
(xk+1 − xk)>(2Qxk + q) ≤ −c‖xk+1 − xk‖22. (31)
By the Descent Lemma (Lemma 2.1 in [10]), for the
quadratic objective function of Assumption 1 we obtain that
f(xk+1) ≤ f(xk) + (xk+1 − xk)>(2Qxk + q)
+ λmaxQ ‖xk+1 − xk‖22, (32)
where λmaxQ denotes the maximum eigenvalue of Q, which
equals half of the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of f . By
(32) and (31) we then have that
f(xk+1) ≤ f(xk)− (c− λmaxQ )‖xk+1 − xk‖22, (33)
TABLE I: Values of λmaxQz and λ
max
Q for different choices of
Q.
Q λmaxQz λ
max
Q
1m×m m− 1 m
1m×m +mIm×m m− 1 2m
mIm×m 0 m
If c > λmaxQ , (33) implies that f(xk+1) ≤ f(xk). Based
on this montonicity condition, and following the proof of
Proposition 3.3, p. 214, of [10] for the unscaled gradient
method, it can be then shown that (27) is a convergent iteration
to some minimizer of P .
1) Comparison with the scaled projected gradient algo-
rithm: In the scaled projected gradient algorithm it was
shown that the step-size should be chosen so that c > λmaxQ ,
where λmaxQ denotes the maximum eigenvalue of Q. Instead,
Theorem 1 requires c > λmaxQz . This latter is a less restrictive
condition since λmaxQ ≥ λmaxQz . Indeed, let v be the eigenvector
corresponding to the eigenvalue λmaxQz . Then, we have
λmaxQz v
>v = v>Qzv = v>(Q−Qd)v
= v>Qv − v>Qdv ≤ v>Qv, (34)
where the first equality follows from the fact that v is the
eigenvector corresponding to λmaxQz and the last inequality
follows from Qd  0. This implies that
λmaxQz ≤
v>Qv
v>v
≤ max
z 6=0
z>Qz
z>z
= λmaxQ , (35)
where the last equality follows recalling the definition of the
induced 2-norm of a symmetric square matrix.
2) Dependence of the regularization coefficient c on the
number of agents: We next provide some examples on how
λmaxQz and λ
max
Q are affected by the structure of the matrix
Q and by the number of agents m. As one can expect, the
more the diagonal part of Q is dominant with respect to the
off diagonal part, the more the difference between λmaxQz and
λmaxQ becomes significant: this is shown in Table I for some
choices of Q (we assume ni = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, for simplicity).
Matrix 1m×m is an m×m matrix with all its elements being
equal to 1.
Note that the condition on the regularization coefficient c
provided in Theorem 1 implicitly accounts through λmaxQz for
how much the agents decisions are coupled in the objective
function.
IV. EXTENSION TO DIFFERENTIABLE CONVEX COST
FUNCTIONS
In this section, we provide a convergence result for Algo-
rithm 1 considering a more general setting as in Assumption 2
under the additional differentiability and Lipschitz continuity
assumptions below.
Assumption 3. The cost function f : Rn → R is continuously
differentiable. The gradient ∇f : Rn → Rn of f : Rn → R
7is Lipschitz continuous on X ⊂ Rn with Lipschitz constant
L ∈ R+, i.e., for all x, y ∈ X ,
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ L‖x− y‖. (36)
The results in the following Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 are
obtained relying on a different approach with respect to the
one based on fixed-points and map properties exploited in the
proof of Theorem 1. Their proofs are reported in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, for all x, y, z ∈
X ⊂ Rn, with x = (x1, . . . , xm), y = (y1, . . . , ym), and
z = (z1, . . . , zm),
‖∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
z
−∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
‖
≤ √mL‖x− y‖, (37)
where L ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of ∇f .
Theorem 2. Consider Algorithm 1. Under Assumptions 2 and
3, if
c >
m− 1
2m− 1
√
mL, (38)
then limk→∞ dist(xk, X∗) = 0, where X∗ is the set of
minimizers of P .
Note that the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 may not
necessarily converge to a minimizer of P , since {xk}k≥0 may
exhibit an oscillatory behavior; however, all its limit points
achieve the optimal value.
By inspecting (38), it can be observed that as the number
of agents m tends to infinity, c tends to infinity as well,
since limm→+∞ m−12m−1
√
mL = +∞. This stems from the fact
that Lipschitz constant in Lemma 1 depends on m. This fact
implies that the optimization problem at step 6 of Algorithm 1
tends to be numerically ill-conditioned as the number of agents
tends to infinity; but this is also the case for the centralized
problem P . It should be also noted that in the other extreme
situation of a single agent (m = 1), (38) implies that any
c > 0 is sufficient for the assertion of Theorem 2 to hold.
This is in line with [10] (Proposition 4.1, p. 233), since step 6
of Algorithm 1 with m = 1, reduces to the standard proximal
minimization. The fact that the higher m, the higher c needs to
be for the statement of Theorem 2 to hold, can be intuitively
justified by the fact that for any i, i = 1, . . . ,m, a higher c will
slow down the progress of the iterates {xi(k)}k≥0, of agent i
towards its optimal value, so that all agents get “synchronized”
in optimizing the common objective function with respect to
their local decision vectors.
The approach adopted in Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 can
also be applied when the cost function f is quadratic, since
Assumptions 2 and 3 are both satisfied under Assumption 1.
The following Lemma applies to that case, and makes the
Lipschitz constant
√
mL in (37) explicit as a function of λmaxQz
(see the Appendix for a proof).
Lemma 2. Consider the set-up of Lemma 1, and Assumption
1. The Lipschitz constant
√
mL in (37) can be replaced by
2λmaxQz , where λ
max
Qz
denotes the maximum eigenvalue of matrix
Qz .
As a consequence, Theorem 2 rewrites as follows.
Theorem 3. Consider Algorithm 1. Under Assumption 1, if
c >
m− 1
2m− 12λ
max
Qz , (39)
then limk→∞ dist(xk, X∗) = 0, where X∗ is the set of
minimizers of P .
Note that (39) implies that as the number of agents m tends
to infinity, c tends to λmaxQz . The latter, however, does not
necessarily imply that c remains finite, since, in certain cases,
λmaxQz may tend to infinity.
The condition c > λmaxQz of Theorem 1 is sufficient for
(39) to be satisfied, since 12 >
m−1
2m−1 , for all m. However,
Theorem 1 ensures convergence to some minimizer and not
just convergence in optimal value as in Theorem 2.
V. OPTIMAL CHARGING OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES
A. Problem setup
We consider the problem of optimizing the charging strategy
for a fleet of m plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) over a finite
horizon T . Following [3], [5], [22], the PEV charging problem
is given by the following optimization problem.
min{
{xi(t)}mi=1
}T
t=0
1
m
T∑
t=0
p(t)
(
d(t) +
m∑
i=1
xi(t)
)2
(40)
subject to
T∑
t=0
xi(t) = γi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m
xi(t) ≤ xi(t) ≤ xi(t), for all i = 1, . . . ,m, t = 0, . . . , T,
where p(t) ∈ R is an electricity price coefficient at time t,
d(t) ∈ R represents the non-PEV demand at time t, xi(t) ∈ R
is the charging rate of vehicle i at time t, γi ∈ R represents
a prescribed charging level to be reached by each vehicle i at
the end of the considered time horizon, and xi(t), xi(t) ∈ R
are bounds on the minimum and maximum value of xi(t),
respectively. The objective function in (40) encodes the total
electricity cost given by the demand (both PEVs and non-
PEVs) multiplied by the price of electricity, which in turn
depends linearly on the total demand through p(t), thus giving
rise to the quadratic function in (40). This linear dependency
of price with respect to the total demand models the fact that
agents/vehicles are price anticipating authorities, anticipating
their consumption to have an effect on the electricity price (see
[2] for further elaboration). Problem (40) can be rewritten in
a more compact form as
min
x∈Rm(T+1)
(d+Ax)>P (d+Ax) (41)
subject to xi ∈ Xi, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
where P = (1/m)diag(p) ∈ R(T+1)×(T+1), and diag(p)
is a matrix with p = (p(0), . . . , p(T )) ∈ RT+1 on its
diagonal. A = 11×m ⊗ I ∈ R(T+1)×m, where ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product, and I is the identity matrix of appro-
priate dimension. Moreover, d = (d(0), . . . , d(T )) ∈ RT+1,
8TABLE II: Number of iterations k for f(xk)−f
?
f? < 10
−6, for
different values of c.
c 0 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.1478 0.2 0.4
k - - 10 16 27 37 77
x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm(T+1) with xi = (xi(0), . . . , xi(T )) ∈
RT+1, and Xi encodes the constraints of each vehicle i,
i = 1, . . . ,m, in (40).
Problem (41) can be solved in a decentralized fashion by
means of Algorithm 1. We compute the value of c so as to
satisfy (39) and, hence, to ensure convergence of the algorithm.
Note that the objective function in (41) is not strictly convex
as A>PA = 1m×m⊗P , and it exhibits a structure that allows
for reduced information exchange as described in Remark 1.
Indeed, at iteration k+ 1 of Algorithm 1, the central authority
needs to collect the solution of each agent but it only has to
broadcast x¯k = d+Axk. Each agent i, i = 1, . . . ,m, can then
compute its objective as f(zi, x−ik ) = (x¯k−xik+zi)>P (x¯k−
xik+z
i). Step 6 in Algorithm 1 for problem (41) reduces then
to
xik+1 = T˜
i(xk) =
arg min
zi∈Xi
{
(x¯k − xik + zi)>P (x¯k − xik + zi) + c‖zi − xik‖2
}
.
B. Simulation results
We consider first a fleet of m = 100 PEVs, each of them
having to reach a different level of charge γi ∈ [0.1, 0.3], i =
1, . . . ,m, at the end of a time horizon T = 24, corresponding
to hourly steps. The bounds on xi(t) are taken to be xi(t) = 0
and xi(t) = 0.02, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, t = 0, . . . , T . The
non-PEV demand profile is retrieved from [3], whereas the
price coefficient is p(t) = 0.15, t = 0, . . . , T . Note that, as in
[5], xi(t) corresponds to normalized charging rate, which is
then rescaled to be turned into reasonable power values. All
optimization problems are solved using CPLEX [30].
For comparison purposes, problem (41) is solved first in
a centralized fashion, achieving an optimal objective value
f? = 2.67. It is then solved in a decentralized fashion by
means of Algorithm 1, setting c = 0.1485. Note that for (39)
to be satisfied, we should have c > 0.1478. In Figure 1a the
objective value f(xk) achieved at iteration k of Algorithm
1 is depicted, whereas Figure 1b shows ‖xk − xk−1‖. After
30 iterations the difference between the decentralized and
the centralized objective is f(x30) − f? = 1.95 · 10−6, thus
achieving numerical convergence.
Figure 2 depicts the PEV, non-PEV, and total demand along
the considered time horizon. As it can be seen, the PEV
demand is optimized so that the over-night valley of the
non-PEV demand is nearly filled-up. Note that due to the
constraints in (41), it is not possible to further increase the
PEV demand during the time interval between 1 and 4.
Considering the same setting, we perform a parametric
analysis, running Algorithm 1 for different values of c. In
Table II the number of iterations needed to achieve a relative
error between the decentralized and the centralized objective
value f(xk)−f
?
f? < 10
−6 is reported. It can be observed that,
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(a) Objective value f(xk) (red stars) at iteration k of Algorithm 1, and
optimal value f? (dashed line) of the centralized problem counterpart.
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(b) Iteration error ‖xk − xk−1‖ (blue squares).
Fig. 1: Objective value and iteration error for m = 100, γi ∈
[0.1, 0.3], xi(t) = 0 and xi(t) = 0.02, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
t = 0, . . . , T .
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Fig. 2: Demand along a one day time horizon: non-PEV
demand (blue squares), PEV demand computed via Algorithm
1 (red stars), and total demand (green circles). The simulation
set-up corresponds to m = 100, γi ∈ [0.1, 0.3], xi(t) = 0 and
xi(t) = 0.02, for i = 1, . . . ,m, t = 0, . . . , T .
as c increases, numerical convergence requires more iterations.
Note that if we choose a value of c that does not satisfy (39),
Algorithm 1 does not always converge (see the first two rows
of Table II, for c = 0 and c = 0.05). For some values of c
numerical convergence is achieved (e.g., rows 3 and 4 of Table
II); however, this is not guaranteed by our analysis.
We consider now a fleet of m = 1000 PEVs, and modify
the required charging level such that γi ∈ [0.005, 0.025], for
all i = 1, . . . ,m, and set the bounds on xi(t) to xi(t) = 0
and xi(t) = 0.0025, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, t = 0, . . . , T . All
the other parameters are left unchanged with respect to the
previous set-up. FAfter 30 iterations the difference between the
decentralized and the centralized objective is f(x30) − f? =
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Fig. 3: Evolution of the iterates xik(t) generated by Algorithm
1 at t = 12 as a function of the iteration index k, for i =
1, . . . , 10, i.e., the first 10 vehicles of the 1000-vehicle fleet.
8.18 · 10−7, thus achieving numerical convergence. However,
with the new set of parameters, the peak of the PEV demand
is designed so as to fill the over-night valley of the non-PEV
demand.
It should be noted that our algorithm converges to a min-
imizer of (40), which is the cooperative problem counterpart
of [3], [5], [22], with a finite number of agents/vehicles (see
Figure 3), as opposed to the aforementioned references, where
convergence to a Nash equilibrium at the limiting case of an
infinite population of agents is established. Note also that the
algorithm proposed in [4] ensures convergence to the optimal
value with a finite number of agents, but not to the optimal
solution.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated convergence of a decen-
tralized, regularized Jacobi algorithm for multi-agent, convex
optimization programs with a common objective and subject
to separable constraints. It was shown that in the case where
the objective function is quadratic the algorithm converges to
some minimizer of the centralized problem via fixed point
arguments. In the more general case of a convex but not
necessarily quadratic cost, we were able to show that all limit
points of the proposed algorithm are minimizers of the cen-
tralized problem. The efficacy of the proposed algorithm was
illustrated by applying it to the problem of optimal charging of
electric vehicles, achieving convergence with a finite number
of vehicles. Current work concentrates on investigating the
rate of convergence for general convex functions, exploiting
the recent fixed-point theoretic results of [31].
APPENDIX
We report some identities which hold directly from the
definition of f and its gradient, that will be exploited in the
following.
m∑
i=1
f(xi, x−i) = mf(x), (42)
∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
x
= ∇f(x), (43)
∇
( m∑
i=1
f(xi, ·)
)∣∣∣
x
= (m− 1)∇f(x), (44)
where by the notation ∇
(∑m
i=1 f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
x
(similarly
for ∇
(∑m
i=1 f(x
i, ·)
)∣∣∣
x
), we imply that the gradient of∑m
i=1 f(·, x−i) is evaluated at x, where for each i, i =
1, . . . ,m, the appropriate component xi of x is employed.
Similar is the interpretation of the various gradient terms
appearing in the subsequent derivations.
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix any x, y, z ∈ X ⊂ Rn, with x =
(x1, . . . , xm), y = (y1, . . . , ym), and z = (z1, . . . , zm). We
then have that
‖∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
z
−∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
‖
= ‖
m∑
i=1
(
∇f(·, x−i)−∇f(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
‖
= ‖
m∑
i=1

0
...(
∇if(·, x−i)−∇if(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
...
0

‖
= ‖

∇1f(z1, x−1)−∇1f(z1, y−1)
...
∇if(zi, x−i)−∇if(zi, y−i)
...
∇mf(zm, x−m)−∇mf(zm, y−m)
 ‖, (45)
where the first equality is obtained by exchanging the gradi-
ent and the summation order, since the gradient is a linear
operator, the second equality is due to the fact that, for each
i, i = 1, . . . ,m, all components of ∇f(·, x−i) (similarly for
∇f(·, y−i) ) will be zero apart from the i-th one that will be
∇if(·, x−i), and the last equality is achieved by performing
the summation and evaluating the quantity in the parentheses
at z. We then have that√√√√ m∑
i=1
‖∇if(zi, x−i)−∇if(zi, y−i)‖2
≤
√√√√ m∑
i=1
L2‖x−i − y−i‖2 ≤ √mL‖x− y‖ (46)
where the first expression follows from (45), the first inequality
is due to fact that, as a consequence of Assumption 3, for each
i = 1, . . . ,m, the i-th component of the gradient is Lipschitz
continuous with a Lipschitz constant upper-bounded by L, i.e.,
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‖∇if(x)−∇if(y)‖ ≤ ‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ L‖x−y‖, for all
x, y ∈ X . The last inequality follows by noticing that ‖x−i−
y−i‖ ≤ ‖x − y‖. Combining (45) and the inequality above
leads then to (37), and hence concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2: From step 6 of Algorithm 1 and by the
definition of T˜ in (7), we have that xk+1 = T˜ (xk). Therefore,
xk+1 is optimal for the objective function that appears in the
right-hand side of (7), hence we have that, for all y ∈ X ,
m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, x
−i
k ) + c‖xk+1 − xk‖2
≤
m∑
i=1
f(yi, x−ik ) + c‖yi − xk‖2. (47)
Since xk ∈ X , setting y = xk and rearranging some terms,
we have that
m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, x
−i
k ) ≤
m∑
i=1
f(xik, x
−i
k )− c‖xk+1 − xk‖2. (48)
By convexity of
∑m
i=1 f(x
i
k+1, ·) due to Assumption 3, we
have that
m∑
i=1
f(xik+1,x
−i
k ) ≥
m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, x
−i
k+1)
+ (xk − xk+1)>∇
( m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, ·)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
. (49)
Combining (48) and (49), and after rearranging some terms,
we obtain that
m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, x
−i
k+1) ≤
m∑
i=1
f(xik, x
−i
k )− c‖xk+1 − xk‖2
+ (xk+1 − xk)>∇
( m∑
i=1
f(xik+1, ·)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
, (50)
which in view of (42) and (44) can be rewritten as
mf(xk+1) ≤ mf(xk)− c‖xk+1 − xk‖2
+ (m− 1)(xk+1 − xk)>∇f(xk+1). (51)
Since xk+1 = T˜ (xk) and due to (7), by the first part of
Proposition 1, with the objective function at the right-hand
side of (7) in place of f , we obtain that
(xk − xk+1)>∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·,x−ik )
)∣∣∣
xk+1
− 2c‖xk+1 − xk‖2 ≥ 0. (52)
Note that ∇
(∑m
i=1 f(·, x−ik )
)∣∣∣
xk+1
+ 2c(xk+1 − xk) is
the gradient of the objective function at the right-hand
side of (7), evaluated at xk+1. Adding the term (xk+1 −
xk)
>∇
(∑m
i=1 f(·, x−ik+1)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
in both sides of (52), we
obtain that
(xk+1 − xk)>∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−ik+1)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
≤ −2c‖xk+1 − xk‖2
− (xk+1 − xk)>
[
∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−ik )
)∣∣∣
xk+1
−∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−ik+1)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
]
.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and due to Lemma 1,
which holds under Assumption 3, we have that
(xk+1 − xk)>∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−ik+1)
)∣∣∣
xk+1
≤ (√mL− 2c)‖xk+1 − xk‖2, (53)
which in view of (43) can be rewritten as
(xk+1 − xk)>∇f(xk+1) ≤ (
√
mL− 2c)‖xk+1 − xk‖2.
(54)
By (51) and (54), we then have that
mf(xk+1) ≤ mf(xk)
+
(− c+ (m− 1)(√mL− 2c))‖xk+1 − xk‖2. (55)
If we choose the regularization coefficient c according to (38),
then the term ‖xk+1−xk‖2 in (55) is multiplied by a negative
constant, and hence (55) shows that f(xk) is a non-increasing
sequence, i.e., for all k ≥ 0, f(xk+1) ≤ f(xk).
Moreover, by (55) and for a given N ∈ R+, we have that
N∑
k=1
−(− c+ (m− 1)(√mL− 2c))‖xk+1 − xk‖2
≤ m
N∑
k=1
(
f(xk)− f(xk+1)
)
= m
(
f(x1)− f(xN+1)
)
.
(56)
Notice that f(x1) − f(xN+1) ≥ 0 due to the fact that
{f(xk)}k≥0 is non-increasing. If c is chosen then according
to (38), and letting N → ∞, the last statement implies that∑∞
k=1 ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 < ∞, thus limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖ = 0,
and hence
lim
k→∞
‖T˜ (xk)− xk‖ = 0. (57)
However, by (55), and under the choice of c in (38), we
have that {f(xk)}k≥0 is a monotonically decreasing sequence,
i.e., f(xk+1) < f(xk) for all k ≥ 0, but for the case where
xk+1 = xk for some k ≥ 0. The latter case implies that there
exists k¯ ≥ 0 such that xk¯+1 = xk¯. Since xk¯+1 = T˜ (xk¯), the
last statement implies that xk¯ is a fixed-point of T˜ , and, due
to Corollary 1, will be a minimizer of P .
Consider now the former case, where {f(xk)}k≥0 is a
monotonically decreasing sequence. Since xk ∈ X for all
k ≥ 0, and X is compact due to Assumption 3, {f(xk)}k≥0
is bounded below. Therefore, the sequence {f(xk)}k≥0 is
convergent. Consider any convergent subsequence of {xk}k≥0
11
and denote by x∗ its limit point. By (57), we then have that
T˜ (xk) converges to x∗ as well. The latter, together with the
fact that T˜ is continuous implies that T˜ (x∗) = x∗, i.e., x∗ is
a fixed-point of T˜ . Note that since T˜ is single-valued as an
effect of being strictly convex due to the presence of the reg-
ularization term, continuity follows from 5.22 in [32] (p. 162)
if the objective function in (7) is continuous differentiable, the
set X is compact, and the minimum in (7) as a function of
x is continuous. Continuous differentiability and compactness
emanate from Assumption 3, whereas it is shown in Exercise
1.19 in [32] (p. 18) that, under the stated assumptions and
since the constraint set does not depend on x, the minimum
is a continuous function of x. Hence, T˜ is continuous and
as shown above x∗ belongs to its fixed-points. Due to the
equivalence between the fixed-points of T˜ and the minimizers
of P shown in Corollary 1, the limit point x∗ of {xk}k≥0 is
also a minimizer of P , hence limk→∞ dist(xk, X∗) = 0, thus
concluding the proof.
It should be noted that the last part of the proof is motivated
by the arguments in p. 214, Chapter 3 of [10].
Proof of Lemma 2: Under Assumption 1, and by the
definition of Qd, Qz , we have that for any x, z ∈ X ,∑m
i=1 f(z
i, x−i) =
∑m
i=1(z
i)>Qi,izi + 2(x−i)>Q−i,izi +
q>i z
i = z>Qdz + 2x>Qzz + q>z, where in the last step
we used the fact that Qz = Q>z . By the last statement we
then have that ∇
(∑m
i=1 f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
z
= 2Qdz + 2Qzx + q.
Following an analogous derivation with y ∈ X in place of
x, we have that ∇
(∑m
i=1 f(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
= 2Qdz + 2Qzy + q.
Therefore,
‖∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, x−i)
)∣∣∣
z
−∇
( m∑
i=1
f(·, y−i)
)∣∣∣
z
‖
= ‖2Qz(x− y)‖ ≤ 2λmaxQz ‖x− y‖, (58)
thus concluding the proof.
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